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I. INTRODUCTION
Websites, Internet retailers, and search engines (known as
"information location tools"') increasingly rely on their users to generate
content, interest, transactions, and value. In the Wild West, which first
characterized the development of the Internet, notions that Usenet sites and
bulletin boards could-or should-be responsible for content posted by
users of the services seemed antithetical to the online ethos.2
In response to early litigation regarding this third-party liability,3
Congress enacted legislation modifying copyright law 4 and defamation
law5 to provide Web hosts broad immunity for indirect infringement.
By comparison, the statutory protection enacted for trademarks is
limited to the unauthorized use of trademarks in domain names. Statutory
protection has not yet developed for trademarks with respect to consumer
postings or advertising purchased by third parties. Therefore, laws
addressing unauthorized use of trademarks have evolved through the
courts.7
Since the enactment of these various laws (defamation immunity in
1996;8 the copyright notice-and-takedown in 19989 and anticybersquatting

1 17 U.S.C. § 512(d) (2006).
2 See, e.g., Tomasz R. Surmacz, Measurement of Data Flow in Usenet
News
Management, 5 MEASUREMENT Sci. REv. 47, 47 (2005) (discussing that articles or links
posted to a Usenet Server are automatically distributed to the whole network of servers,
which in turn makes monitoring the links difficult).
See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., Inc., 907 F.
Supp. 1361, 1368 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
4 17 U.S.C. § 512(a).
' 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) ("No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall
be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information
content provider.").
6 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2006).
7
See, e.g., Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 803-04 (9th Cir. 2002).
47 U.S.C. § 230. See also Ken S. Myers, Wikimmunity: Fitting the Communications
Decency Act to Wikipedia, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 163, 165 (2006).
9 17 U.S.C. § 512. See also THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1998, U.S.
COPYRIGHT OFFICE 12 (Dec. 1998), http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.pdf
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in 199910), the Internet has moved from an interesting social phenomenon
to a central component of social interaction and media engagement.
Facebook now boasts 845 million monthly active users, 250 million
photos uploaded daily, and 2.7 billion "likes" and comments each day."
YouTube boasts 48 hours of video uploaded per minute and 3 billion views
each day.12 Content on these various social media sites has triggered
complaints from companies worldwide. In 2011, Chilling Effects, a
project of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, recorded 47,628 complaints
from companies in the United States and slightly fewer from companies
located outside the country.' 3
Twitter has received a number of complaints as well. In response,
"Twitter has taken the unusual step of making [Digital Millennium
Copyright Act] takedown notices public, in partnership with Chilling
Effects ... and several universities. The site shows 4,410 cease and desist
notices dating back to November 2010."4 While the percentage of
complaints suggests that the notice-and-takedown system is only a minor
aspect of the Internet media ecology, the existence of the system remains a
source of tremendous anger for many.
o 15 U.S.C.

§ 1125(d). See also W. Chad Shear, The Anticybersquatting Consumer

ProtectionAct-An Offensive Weapon for Trademark Holders, 2001 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. &
POL'Y 219, 219 (2001).

1 Facebook, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Feb. 1, 2012), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/000119312512034517/
d287954ds1.htm#toc287954_2.
12 Danny Goodwin, New YouTube Statistics: 48 Hours of Video Uploaded Per Minute;
3 Billion Views Per Day, SEARCH ENGINE WATCH (May 25, 2011), http://searchengine
watch.com/article/2073962/New-YouTube-Statistics-48-Hours-of-Video-Uploaded-PerMinute-3-Billion-Views-Per-Day.
13 Data from the Chilling Effects Clearinghouse, CHILLING EFFECTS, https://www.
chillingeffects.org/stats (last visited Apr. 6, 2013).
14 Jon Brodkin, Twitter Uncloaks a Year's Worth ofDMCA Takedown Notices, 4,410 in
All, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 27, 2012, 2:50 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2012/
01/twitter-uncloaks-a-years-worth-of-dmca-takedown-notices-44 10-in-all.ars.
15 See Tim Cushing, The True Damage of an Illegitimate DMCA Takedown Goes Much
Further Than Simple "Inconvenience," TECHDIRT (Mar. 7, 2012), http://www.techdirt.com/
articles/20120306/15184918004/true-damage-illegitimate-dmca-takedown-goes-muchfurther-than-simple-inconvenience.shtml; Problems with Notice and Takedown, U.
PENNSYLVANIA, http://tags.library.upenn.edu/project/35599 (last visited Feb. 22, 2013)
(giving a collection of links to blogs and articles expressing anger regarding the DMCA).
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Moreover, significant litigation in the past year has refocused on using
these legal tools to tidy the Internet and to cleanse it of unwanted or
unauthorized content.' 6 This Article focuses on the recent activity in the
courts and Congress regarding the various attempts to deal with
unauthorized, unwanted, and controversial content available on the
Internet.
II. COPYRIGHT
The notice-and-takedown provisions of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA) were written in response to Religious Technology
7
Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc."1
In this case, the
Church of Scientology used copyright infringement actions to stop the
unauthorized disclosure of church documents and teachings it treated as
confidential.' 8 Although the court found no direct copyright infringement
for the bulletin board service for hosting the content uploaded by the
defendant, the court did not dismiss the claims of secondary liability based
on the theory of contributory infringement.' 9 The court found that once the
plaintiff had put the defendant on notice of the infringing content, the act
of facilitating distribution of protected works could amount to substantial
participation:
Providing a service that allows for the automatic
distribution of all Usenet postings, infringing and
noninfringing, goes well beyond renting a premises to an
infringer... . Thus, it is fair, assuming Netcom is able to
take simple measures to prevent further damage to
plaintiffs' copyrighted works, to hold Netcom liable for
contributory infringement where Netcom has knowledge
of [the direct infringer's] infringing postings yet continues
to aid in the accomplishment of [the infringer's] purpose
of publicly distributing the postings.20
In light of the potentially broad common law secondary liability that
could arise under Copyright, Congress enacted 17 U.S.C. § 512. The goal
16 See,

e.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 667 F.3d 1022 (9th

Cir. 2011).
17907

F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).

" Id. at 1366.

"Id. at 1382.
20
Id. at 1375.
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was to provide immunity from ongoing liability in the event that an
indirect infringer took expeditious action to remove allegedly infringing

content. 2 1
Section 512(c) applies to those systems that store and make data
available at the request of the consumer:
Information Residing on Systems or Networks at
Direction of Users.(1) In general.-A service provider shall not be liable
for monetary relief, or, except as provided in subsection
(j), for injunctive or other equitable relief, for infringement
of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a
user of material that resides on a system or network
controlled or operated by or for the service provider, if the
service provider(A)(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material
or an activity using the material on the system or network
is infringing;
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not
aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing
activity is apparent; or
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material;
(B) does not receive a financial benefit directly
attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in which the
service provider has the right and ability to control such
activity; and
(C) upon notification of claimed infringement as
described in paragraph (3), responds expeditiously to
remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to
be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity.2 2

See Perfect 10, Inc, v. CCBill, LLC, 340 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1086 (C.D. Cal. 2004),
aff'd inpart, rev'd in part, 481 F.3d 751 (9th Cir. 2007).
21

22 17

U.S.C. § 512(c) (2006).
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The first section of the statute closely mirrors the common law
protection of secondary liability. 23 Section 512(c)(1)(A) describes the
copyright contributory liability standard.24
As the Supreme Court
explained, "One infringes contributorily by intentionally inducing or
encouraging direct infringement ... and infringes vicariously by profiting
from direct infringement while declining to exercise a right to stop or limit
it."25

As to vicarious liability, in Viacom International v. YouTube, Inc.,26
the Second Circuit held that the language of § 512(c)(1)(B) requires
"something more" than the common law right and ability to control. 27 The
Viacom court rejected as legislative history as confusing and nondispositive.28 The court explained that "if Congress had intended
§ 512(c)(1)(B) to be coextensive with vicarious liability, 'the statute could
have accomplished that result in a more direct manner."' 2 9 Instead, the
"something more" requires that "a service provider exert[] substantial
influence on the activities of users."30 If this substantial influence is
demonstrated, then the service provider may be liable "without
necessarily-or even frequently-acquiring knowledge of specific
infringing activity." 31 The heightened influence is consistent with the
Restatement approach to vicarious liability, which imputes all the actions
of the agent to the principal when the agent is an employee 32 or acting

See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930
(2005); Gershwin Publ'n Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d
Cir. 1971).
24 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A).
25 Grokster, 545 U.S.
at 930.
26 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012).
23

7

Id. at 38.

28 Id. at 37 ("Happily, the future of digital copyright law does not turn on the confused

legislative history of the control provision.").
29 Id. at 37 (emphasis added) (quoting UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners
LLC, 667 F.3d 1022, 1045 (9th Cir. 2011)).
30
Id. at 38.
31id.

§ 7.03(2) (2006) ("A principal is subject to
vicarious liability to a third party harmed by an agent's conduct when .. . the agent is an
employee who commits a tort while acting within the scope of employment .... ).
32 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY

2013]

TIDYING UP THE INTERNET

519

with, at least, apparent authority. The "something more" test of Viacom
reconciles vicarious liability with its common-law roots.
The provisions of § 512(c)(1) allow courts to distinguish between
those services that are materially participating in copyright violations with
knowledge of their activities from those entities that can be used for
infringement along with non-infringing activities. A service may avoid
material participation provided that entity "responds expeditiously to
remove, or disable access to" the material that is claimed to be infringing. 3 4
The examples of this distinction may be more self-evident than the tests
suggest. Litigated examples include YouTube35 and Veoh Networks,3 6
while Yahoo, Facebook, Rapidshare, and other services host usergenerated content and face similar scrutiny. While some of the users are
undoubtedly uploading content that infringes exclusive rights of copyright
owners, these services do not seek out these customers, provide
preferential tools for infringement, or promote infringing activities in their
materials.
In contrast to these services, those such as Napster, Grokster, and
Streamcast materially contribute to the infringement activities of their user
community.38 Most importantly, in separating these provisions, the courts
tend to look at § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii), which imposes a duty when the content
host becomes "aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing
activity is apparent."3 9

Id. ("A principal is subject to vicarious liability to a third party harmed by an agent's
conduct when . .. the agent commits a tort when acting with apparent authority in dealing
with a third party on or purportedly on behalf of the principal.").
34 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C) (2006).
3 Viacom, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 527.
36 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 667 F.3d 1022, 1050 (9th
Cir. 2011) (granting summary judgment for the hosting service).
3 Cf Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 935-36
(2005) (noting that using advertising to attract infringing customers, providing a good to aid
in copyright infringement, and telling users how to participate in an infringing use are
classic cases for finding copyright violations).
3 See id at 930-32 (providing cases where courts found that companies did or did not
materially contribute to infringement activities).
3 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii).
3
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A. Red Flag Test Adds Little
This subsection has become known as the "red flag" test. Once the
service provider becomes aware of these facts, it will lose the protection of
the safe harbor unless it acts expeditiously. 40 Despite the construction,
however, the duty is on the copyright owner to make the service provider
aware of these facts and circumstances.4 1 In Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill
LLC,42 for example, "there were a number of red flags that made it
apparent infringing activity was afoot, noting that the defendant hosted
sites with names such as 'illegal.net' and 'stolencelebritypics.com,' as well
as password hacking websites, which obviously infringe." 4 3 These highly
suggestive facts were not enough. Instead, the Ninth Circuit explained that
it places no investigative duties on the service provider."
As such,
generalized knowledge of infringing use is insufficient to find secondary
liability for a host.45
Once the copyright holder has provided the information, however, the
service provider is under a duty to act expeditiously. 46 Both the service
provider and the copyright holder have certain duties to assure the system
48
4'
works.47
The service provider must provide a designated agent.
Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii).
41 Viacom Int'l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 32 (2d Cir. 2012) ("[W]e affirm the
[d]istrict [c]ourt's holding that actual knowledge or awareness of facts or circumstances that
indicate specific and identifiable instances of infringement will disqualify a service provider
from the safe harbor.").
42 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007).
43 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 667 F.3d 1022, 1038 (9th
Cir. 2011) (quoting Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1114).
4 Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1114.
40

45 id
46

1d at 1111.

§ 512(c)(2)-(3) (2006).

47

17 U.S.C.

48

Section 512(c)(2) states:
Designated agent.-The limitations on liability established in this
subsection apply to a service provider only if the service provider has
designated an agent to receive notifications of claimed infringement
described in paragraph (3), by making available through its service,
including on its website in a location accessible to the public, and by
providing to the Copyright Office, substantially the following
information:
(continued)
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Assuming the agent has been designated properly, the copyright holder
must provide notice to that agent in a form consistent with the statute to
afford effective notice.4 9
(A) the name, address, phone number, and electronic mail address
of the agent.
(B) other contact information which the Register of Copyrights
may deem appropriate.
The Register of Copyrights shall maintain a current directory of
agents available to the public for inspection, including through the
Internet, in both electronic and hard copy formats, and may require
payment of a fee by service providers to cover the costs of maintaining
the directory.
Id § 512(c)(2).
49 Section 512(c)(3) states:
Elements of notification.(A) To be effective under this subsection, a notification of claimed
infringement must be a written communication provided to the
designated agent of a service provider that includes substantially the
following:
(i) A physical or electronic signature of a person authorized to act
on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed.
(ii) Identification of the copyrighted work claimed to have been
infringed, or, if multiple copyrighted works at a single online site are
covered by a single notification, a representative list of such works at
that site.
(iii) Identification of the material that is claimed to be infringing or
to be the subject of infringing activity and that is to be removed or
access to which is to be disabled, and information reasonably sufficient
to permit the service provider to locate the material.
(iv) Information reasonably sufficient to permit the service
provider to contact the complaining party, such as an address, telephone
number, and, if available, an electronic mail address at which the
complaining party may be contacted.
(v) A statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief
that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized
by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law.
(vi) A statement that the information in the notification is accurate,
and under penalty of perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to
(continued)
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The notice is not difficult in form, but one providing a takedown notice
must attend to the details with care. The work or works must be identified
correctly,o the notice must provide sufficient information to identify the
location of the infringing work and source of the infringement,5' and the
copyright holder-or the authorized agent of the copyright holder-must
attest that the complainant "has a good faith belief that use of the material
in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its
agent, or the law."52 Finally, the complainant must attest that the notice is
accurate and authorized under penalty of peijury.53
There is no detailed, objective information on the attitude taken by
various vendors regarding the process of takedown. Nonetheless, many
use services such as Audible Magic or Vobile to create "digital
fingerprints" of the files presented to the service provider.5 4 If those

act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly
infringed.
(B)(i) Subject to clause (ii), a notification from a copyright owner
or from a person authorized to act on behalf of the copyright owner that
fails to comply substantially with the provisions of subparagraph (A)
shall not be considered under paragraph (1)(A) in determining whether
a service provider has actual knowledge or is aware of facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent.
(ii) In a case in which the notification that is provided to the
service provider's designated agent fails to comply substantially with
all the provisions of subparagraph (A) but substantially complies with
clauses (ii), (iii), and (iv) of subparagraph (A), clause (i) of this
subparagraph applies only if the service provider promptly attempts to
contact the person making the notification or takes other reasonable
steps to assist in the receipt of notification that substantially complies
with all the provisions of subparagraph (A).
Id. § 512(c)(3).
' 0 Id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(ii).
' Id § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii).
52 Id § 512(c)(3)(A)(v).
3 Id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(vi).
54 Vobile Expands Copyright Infringement Technology,

WALL

ST. J.

SPEAKEASY

(Dec.

8, 2011, 5:31 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/speakeasy/2011/12/08/vobile-expands-copyrightinfringement-technology/?KEYWORDS=Vobile.
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uploaded files match files in the database, the content is flagged and may
be removed."
Or maybe not. YouTube, for example, uses the software to match the
digital fingerprint to the actual usage rights on file in its automated
system. 6 If the usage allows the file to be shown with advertising, then it
adds a badge enabling the advertising.57 Using these types of tools,
companies may be developing strategies to monetize and tacitly authorize
what would otherwise have been unauthorized user-sourced third-party
content. For example, a digital fingerprint of a cloud music sharing service
could measure the number of times a song is uploaded as well as
downloaded and streamed. This would make each event part of the license
fee for the music and would re-associate any advertising with the usersourced content so that it legally takes on the same attributes as the
authorized content on the site-as YouTube has done.
B. CounterNotification
Although copyright holders must make a good faith determination that
the material uploaded by third parties violates their exclusive rights," this
may not mean that the copyright holders make bona fide assessments of
fair use. Some owners may not be able to objectively consider that any use
of their material is a fair use (notwithstanding the law on the matter), while
others struggle to address hundreds or thousands of simultaneous
infringements of a particular work and simply do not review the details of
each unauthorized use.
55

id.

Content ID, YouTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/contentid
(last visited Feb. 22,
2013). YouTube answered the question, "How does Content ID work?" as follows:
56

Rights holders deliver YouTube reference files (audio-only or
video) of content they own, metadata describing that content, and
policies on what they want YouTube to do when we find a match.
We compare videos uploaded to YouTube against those reference
files.
Our technology automatically identifies your content and applies
your preferred policy: monetize, track, or block.
Id.
57

id.

58

See id.

17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) (2006).
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In addition to the disputes involving fair use, there may be mistakes in
takedown notifications regarding the source of the work or the identity of
the person who uploaded the content. Congress anticipated these issues by
including a provision in the statute requiring subjects of takedown requests
to respond to the notices.o
In other cases, the actions may be more intentional. In a filing by
Verizon regarding a proposal to update the designation of agent, the
telecommunications giant vented about the misuse of the takedown system:
While Verizon receives valid "notice and takedown"
requests from copyright owners and responds promptly
with the "take down" and counter-notification processes,
we have unfortunately also experienced increasing misuses
of the Designated Agent information located on the
Copyright Office's website. The misuses fall into a
variety of categories, including cases of (i) P2P and other
file sharing activities where the material alleged to be
infringed does not reside on a service provider's system or
network, yet ISPs are often sent automated "takedown"
notices by the thousands; (ii) allegations of trademark
infringement, where the DMCA "notice and takedown"
provision does not apply; (iii) material that is protected by
the "fair use" defense of the Copyright Act; and (iv)
abusive litigation tactics made in the alarming growth of
"copyright troll" lawsuits. The latter involve legal motions
often brought by those representing the "adult"
entertainment industry who are using improper discovery
tactics in federal and state courts to obtain the personal
information (name, address and "Mac" number) of
hundreds of ISP subscribers per case. In most instances,
the litigation never proceeds as the intent is to extract
multiple payments from thousands of defendants, many of
whom are likely to settle due to the expense of defending
the litigation and the embarrassing nature of the content
alleged to be infringed.

60Id. § 512(g).
61 Letter from Sarah B. Deutsch, Vice President and Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Verizon
Comnc'ns Inc., Re: Request for Public Comment on Designation of Agent to Receive
(continued)
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The complaints regarding the abuse of the takedown system suggest
that a number of other issues need to be addressed beyond merely the
counter-notification process. Although an invalid notification creates no
legal duty to respond, 62 it will likely require the recipient to expend some
time and effort to evaluate. As discussed subsequently, a notice-andtakedown system for trademarks, no matter how valid an infringement
claim, simply does not exist.6 3 On the other hand, an Internet service
provider (ISP) may not be a host to a peer-to-peer file-sharing site, but it
might still provide "information location tools" in the form of links to the
site or the ads promoting the illegal content. The information location
tools are subject to § 512(d) takedown notifications and may be applicable
to some of the situations described by Verizon.64
Noncompliant notifications, such as the identification of links or of
trademark infringement could also build a record of actual knowledge of
specific infringing activity. That record would support a claim for
secondary liability in those areas where an ISP materially participates in
the infringement. Google, for example, was involved in a case promoting
pharmaceuticals that were illegally sold in the United States and was
forced to disgorge a $500 million payment, representing all of its own
profits and the profits of the advertisers.s ISPs and other large companies
are not immune to liability for illegal conduct. Nonetheless, the frustration
of Verizon reflects a real issue of overuse, at least in some instances.
For the average individual uploading to YouTube or another social
media site, § 512(g) provides a mechanism to file a counter notification
that encourages the reinstatement of the material.66 The law does not
require the service provider to reinstate the material, but instead strips the
service provider of the safe harbor protection if it fails to do so. 67 To retain
the safe harbor protection, the potentially infringing material must be
Notification
of Claimed
Infringement
(Nov.
28,
2011),
available at
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/onlinesp/comments/201 1/initial/verizon.pdf.
62 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3) (stating that to be effective, the notification
must include the
elements in this subsection).
63 See discussion infra Part
IV.
6 17 U.S.C. § 512(d).
65 See Thomas Catan, Con Artist Starred in Sting that Cost Google
Millions, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 25, 2012, at Al. The revenue was generated through Google's Adwords program.
Id.
66 17 U.S.C. § 512(g).
61 d. § 512(g)(2).
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reinstated "not less than 10, nor more than 14, business days following
receipt of the counter notice unless" the service provider is notified that a
legal action has been filed. In this way, the notifying party has ten days
to bring a legal action before the material is reinstated, but the posting
party will be able to have the content reinstated within two weeks.69
The Electronic Frontier Foundation has created a simple, elegant letter
that is generated through a browser-based checklist.70 Assuming a person
seeking to file the counter-notice has selected each of the response boxes in
the affirmative, the body of the text provides a nicely drafted response:
Please find attached to this letter a list of material
removed by you pursuant to 17 U.S.C. Section 512. I have
a good faith belief that this material was removed or
disabled in error as a result of mistake or misidentification
of the material. I declare that this is true and accurate
under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United
States of America.
For purposes of this matter, I consent to the jurisdiction
of the Federal District Court for the judicial district in
which I reside. I also consent to service of process by the
person providing notification under Section 512(c)(1)(C)
or that person's agent. However, by this letter, I do not
waive any other rights, including the ability to pursue an
action for the removal or disabling of access to this
material, if wrongful.
Having complied with the requirement of Section
512(g)(3), I remind you that you must now replace the
blocked or removed material and cease disabling access to
it within fourteen business days of your receipt of this
notice. Please notify me when this has been done. . .

6
69

70

Id. § 5 12(g)(2)(C).
Id. § 512(g)(2).
Counter-Notification, CHILLING

EFFECTS,

http://www.chillingeffects.org/dmcal

counter512.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2013).
n Id. To generate the form counter-notice, in which the quoted language appears, select
each box on the webpage, input the applicable contact information, and click the "Generate
Counter Notice" button.
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As noted in the draft response, the statement that "you must now
replace" should be supplemented with, "or lose the safe harbor protections
of 17 U.S.C. Section 512(g)(1)." Nonetheless, the letter provides a very
nice, consumer-friendly tool for responding to overaggressive takedown
requests.
C. CurrentRulemaking
One of the problems plaguing the takedown notification system is the
chum among the companies and the registered agents who are designated
to receive the notices.7 2
The Copyright Office is proposing changes to the method of agent
designation to make the system more efficient. As a result, the Copyright
Office has proposed new rules for designating and updating electronic
notice agents.74 The Copyright Office summarizes the process as follows:
Designation of Online Service ProviderAgent
The Copyright Office is proposing to amend its
regulations and practices governing the designation by
online service providers of agents to receive notifications
of claimed copyright infringement as provided for in
section 512 of the Copyright Act. The Office intends to
implement an electronic process by which service
providers may designate agents to receive notifications of
claimed infringement and an electronic database of
designated agents of online service providers. In order to
create the online database and to update the information
currently maintained by the Copyright Office, it is
proposed that all online service providers must file new
designations of agents within one year after new
regulations go into effect, and that thereafter all online
service providers must update and/or verify the accuracy

72 See

Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that failure to
forward e-mail from the first registered agent to the current active registered agent resulted
in a loss of safe harbor protection).
7 Designation of Agent to Receive Notification of Claimed Infringement, 76 Fed. Reg.
59,953 (Sept. 28, 2011) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201).
74 Id. at 59,959-60.
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of their information in the database at least once every two
75
years.
The public comment period closed in late December 2011,76 from
which a general theme emerged. Commentators expressed concern that
while an electronic database of the agents would be helpful to the public,
the new system would generate a good deal of confusion and could result
in the inadvertent loss of safe harbor protection.77 Failure to update one's
agent in the new database, either initially or over time, would result in the
automatic loss of the safe harbor protection.78 This risk would likely be
much larger for smaller companies with only occasional user-generated
content and rare contact with the takedown system. Because the proposal
would strip a company of the safe harbor in the event of non-renewal even
if the website information was correct, it could become a trap for the
uninitiated. At the same time, however, the database would likely prove
far more important for members of the public who are trying to provide a
counter-notice, and it would add to the general transparency of the system.
While the Copyright Office is tinkering with the system, the modest
scope of the proposed rulemaking also suggests a general acceptance of the
current system. 79 The Verizon comments and other complaints certainly
show there are flaws in the system, but in the context of the billions of files
uploaded and links shared, the system may achieve its compromise fairly
effectively.

III. DEFAMATION

AND HARMFUL SPEECH

A. Online Defamation Generally
Online, there are many opportunities to be subject to a lawsuit for
familiar claims like defamation.8 0 Liability for defamation, specifically
75

Rulemaking

Proceedings,

COPYRIGHT,

http://www.copyright.gov/laws/

rulemaking.html (last updated Oct. 26, 2012).
76 Designation of Agent to Receive Notification of Claimed Infringement,
76 Fed. Reg.
at 59,953.
7 See Initial Comments on ProposedRulemaking for Designation ofAgents to Receive
Notification of ClaimedInfringement, COPYRIGHT, http://www.copyright.gov/docs/onlinesp/
comments/201 1/initiall (last visited Apr. 6, 2013).
78 Designation of Agent to Receive Notification of Claimed Infringement, 76 Fed. Reg.
at 59,959.
7 Id. at 59,954.
80 2 INTERNET LAW AND PRACTICE § 24:13 (2009).
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libel, is nothing new under the law. With the ubiquitous nature of the
Internet as a news and social reporting tool, however, allegedly libelous
statements can very quickly take on lives of their own. Online defamation
lawsuits are following suit. For example, allegations of Twitter libel,
known to some as "Twibel," are becoming commonplace, and the stakes
can be high.8'
While there are no defamation regulations in the United States for the
online environment specifically, publishing any statement on Internetbased media-including websites, blogs, and social networking sites-can
result in a defamation lawsuit. 82 Although the First Amendment to the
Constitution does afford protection for online discourse, defamation
standards apply equally to the speaker in the online environment as in more
traditional media. 83 Speech concerning public officials and public figures
is afforded heightened First Amendment protection in defamation law,84
and some states have applied a heightened standard to identify "John Doe"
plaintiffs in defamation cases on First Amendment grounds. Otherwise,

8 Kara

Hansen Murphey, Defamation in 140 Charactersor Less, PORTLAND TRIBUNE
(Sept. 7, 2011, 5:00 PM), http://portlandtribune.com/component/content/article?id=1 1881.
In 2011, singer Courtney Love paid fashion designer Dawn Simorangkir $430,000 to settle
Simorangkir's defamation lawsuit based on Love's allegedly libelous attacks in a series of
tweets-and posts on MySpace and Etsy accounts-in 2009. Id. In addition, a Twitter libel
case was filed in the Multnomah County Circuit Court in Oregon. Dr. Jerry Darm sued
blogger Tiffany Craig for $1 million based on Craig's comments on her Twitter account,
@tcraighenry, and her blog, Criminallyvulgar, through which she mentions Darm offered
treatment for sex. Id.
82 See, e.g., id.
83 In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d 1168, 1173
(9th Cir. 2011).
84 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 327-28 (1974) (public
figures may
prevail in a libel action only if they prove that the defamatory statements were made with
actual malice, whereas private figures need prove only negligence); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (actual malice standard applies to public officials).
85 States requiring a heightened standard to identify John Doe defendants include the
following: Arizona, California, Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, New
Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and the District of Columbia. For a
discussion of the issue of free speech concerns with anonymous speech online, see Brian
Hyer, Protecting John Doe: A New Standardfor John Doe Subpoenas that Respects the
Right to Speak Anonymously Online, 9 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 495 (2010).
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United States defamation standards in cyberspace are based on their offline counterparts.
Internet content can theoretically be viewed globally, so it is important
to consider online defamation laws that apply to potential plaintiffs in other
parts of the world. For example, Australia's highest court found that Dow
Jones, publisher of numerous periodicals, including the Wall Street Journal
and Barron's, could be sued in Australia over an article that was written in
the United States and distributed over the Internet.87 In addition, the
United Kingdom currently is reviewing a draft "Defamation Bill" that was
developed in March 2011 and is scheduled to be introduced in amended
form to Parliament in May 2011.88 The United Kingdom's Defamation
Bill specifically addresses online defamation.89
B. Third-PartyLimitationsfrom the Communications Decency Act of 1996
Where online defamation differs fundamentally from its physicalworld counterpart is in the area of secondary liability. Title V of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, more commonly known as the
Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), 90 was promulgated in
response to a growing concern surrounding online publication of
pornography and other adult content.9 1 Furthermore, the CDA also applies
to claims against online publishers of allegedly defamatory content.92
Section 230(c)(1) of the CDA states, "No provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content provider."9 3

86

INTERNET LAW AND PRACTICE, supranote 80.

See Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick (2002) 210 CLR 575 (Austl.), available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/high~ct/2002/56.html.
88 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, DRAFT DEFAMATION BILL: CONSULTATION, 2011, Cm. 8020
(U.K.), available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/consultations/draft-defamationbill-consultation.pdf (the draft and consultation paper explaining its development).
8
Id. at 3.
90 Telecommunications Act of 1996 (Communications Decency Act), Pub. L. No. 104104, tit. V, 110 Stat. 56, 133-43.
91 Deborah Milham, The Constitutional Issues Presented by the Communications
Decency Act's Application to HIV/AIDS Information on the Internet, 8 ALB. L.J. SCI. &
TEcH. 195, 196 (1997).
92 See, e.g., Barnes v. YAHOO!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2009).
9347 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006).
87
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This provision of the statute reversed the common law doctrine. The
Restatement (Second) of Torts summarizes the common law rule: "Except
as to those who only deliver or transmit defamation published by a third
person, one who repeats or otherwise republishes defamatory matter is
subject to liability as if he had originally published it." 94 Newspapers were
of particular concern for reporting the libels of others:
Thus a newspaper is subject to liability if it republishes a
defamatory statement, although it names the author and
another newspaper in which the statement first appeared.
The republication of a libel, being a separate publication,
may make the second publisher liable although the original
publisher is protected by a privilege.
America Online, CompuServe, and other services were concerned that
they had neither the knowledge nor capacity to respond to claims of
defamation, and feared that such obligations would hobble the
development of the nascent Internet; 96 Congress agreed. 97

94

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 (1977).
'Id. § 578 cmt. b.
96See generally Sewali K. Patel, Immunizing Internet Service Providersfrom ThirdParty Internet Defamation Claims: How Far Should Courts Go?, 55 VAND. L. REv. 647,
660-61 (2002).
9 The House added § 230 to the CDA to protect online service providers from thirdparty liability, and explained its policy for doing so:
9

It is the policy of the United States(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and other
interactive computer services and other interactive media;
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that
presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services,
unfettered by Federal or State regulation;
(3) to encourage the development of technologies which maximize
user control over what information is received by individuals, families,
and schools who use the Internet and other interactive computer
services;
(4) to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of
blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents to restrict
their children's access to objectionable or inappropriate online material;
and
(continued)
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In exchange, however, Congress sought "to encourage service
providers to self-regulate the dissemination of offensive material over their
services"9 8 by removing risk of liability in instances where the service
providers take steps to remove offensive content.
To provide this protection, § 230(c)(2) provides:
No provider or user of an interactive computer service
shall be held liable on account of(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict
access to or availability of material that the provider or
user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy,
excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable,
whether or not such material is constitutionally protected;
or
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to
information content providers or others the technical
means to restrict access to material described in
[subparagraph (A)].99
The CDA therefore provides nearly blanket protection against liability
for user-generated content stored on ISP servers. Service providers are
immune from liability regardless of whether they attempt to remove
potentially defamatory content. 0 0 Computer mediated services have been
developed to provide some hosts a measure of content moderating, but the
method of monitoring has no impact on liability.'o
Additionally, the protection for service providers is drafted broadly.
The CDA defines "interactive computer service" as "any information
service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables
computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including
specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and
(5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to
deter and punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by
means of computer.
47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (2006).
98 Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997).
U.S.C. § 230(c)(2).
1ooSee Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1037 (9th Cir. 2003).
101Melissa A. Troiano, The New Journalism? Why Traditional Defamation Laws
Should Apply to Internet Blogs, 55 Am. U. L. REV. 1447, 1469-70 (2006).
9'47
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such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational
institutions," and "information content provider" as "any person or entity
that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of
information provided through the Internet or any other interactive
computer service."l02
Most importantly, unlike the duties to address potential copyright
issues, the protection for ISPs under the CDA has no takedown obligations,
no requirement that the ISP accept notice of potential third-party liability,
and no obligation to respond to a complaint of defamation.103 Courts have
interpreted § 230 to relieve ISPs of liability for the defamatory nature of
information published by their users.104 In most instances, ISPs are not
considered legally responsible for the harm caused by information that
their users publish online.10 This result is consistent with the traditional
off-line requirement that a media defendant in a defamation suit must be
found to have some degree of fault in publishing allegedly defamatory
statements. 0 6
C. Responses to Harmful Speech
Notwithstanding the broad statement of immunity, there may be a
number of techniques for addressing defamatory material on the Internet.
102

47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2)-(3).

103 See Austin

v. Crystaltech Web Hosting, 125 P.3d 389, 393-94 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005)
(explaining that the CDA immunized the web hosting company from liability for hosting a
third party's website that allegedly contained defamatory statements about plaintiff despite
the web hosting company having received notice regarding the defamatory nature of the
content it was hosting).
i0 See, e.g., Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1029 (declaring that an operator of a listserv and
website is a user of interactive computer services, entitling CDA protection from liability
for publishing information provided by another information provider); Barrett v. Rosenthal,
146 P.3d 510, 513 (Cal. 2006) (ruling that § 230 immunized defendant from liability for
republishing an allegedly defamatory article authored by a third party, effectively
establishing that "distributors" or "secondary publishers" are entitled to the same broad
immunity afforded to publishers under the CDA).
105 47 U.S.C.§ 230(c)(1) ("No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall
be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information
content provider.").
106 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347-48 (1974) (establishing that a
private figure who brings a suit for defamation cannot recover without some showing that
the media defendant was at fault in publishing the statements at issue).

534

CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[41:513

Most obviously, the inability to bring an action or a notice against ISPs
does not immunize parties who have posted defamatory material.1 o7
Therefore, legal action often begins with a "cease and desist" letter
demanding takedown of the offending published language.108 Sharing this
information with ISPs and asking for relief may result in some response.
As noted, ISPs are immunized from liability regardless of whether they
choose to respond. 09
Depending on the nature of the content in question, there may also be
relief under cyberstalking or cyberbullying laws. "Many states have
enacted 'cyberstalking' or 'cyberharassment' laws or have laws that
explicitly include electronic forms of communication within more
traditional stalking or harassment laws. In addition, recent concerns about
protecting minors from online bullying or harassment have led states to
enact 'cyberbullying' laws." 1 o To the extent the offensive speech
constitutes harassment under the state law definition, there are state
statutory remedies authorizing the removal of content and the arrest of
parties responsible for posting such content."
Similarly, if the offensive content includes protected informationincluding driver's license information, social security numbers, credit card
data, health data, or protected financial information-the various state and
federal privacy laws can be used to force the removal of the content.1 12
Generally, laws that emphasize liability for disclosure do not limit their
liability to "speakers" or "publishers"; failure of ISPs to remove protected
information could give rise to direct liability, rather than mere secondary
liability as a republisher of the user-generated content.1 13
10'See Barrett, 146 P.3d at 513.
1os

E.g., Online Policy Grp. v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1198 (N.D. Cal.

2004).
109 See Ryan Dube, How to Remove False Information About Yourself on Internet,
MAKEUSEOF (Jan. 16, 2009), http://www.makeuseof.com/tag/how-to-remove-false-libelousinformation-about-yourself-online/.
110 State Cyberstalking and Cyberharassment Laws, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES

(Nov. 16, 2012), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecommunications-informationtechnology/cyberstalking-cyberharassment-and-cyberbullying-.aspx.
" See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 708.7 (West 2003); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.61.260
(2010).
2
11 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (2006); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1347.10 (West 2004).
113 See Matthew Schruers, The History and Economics of ISP Liabilityfor Third
Party
Content, 88 VA. L. REv. 205, 211 (2002).
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Despite the limitations on copyright causes of action, copyright
remains a more effective tool for curbing harmful speech online.
Copyright has an express notice-and-takedown mechanism: Any
allegations that the offensive content was copyrighted material-such as
photographs or unauthorized re-postings of the target's work-need only
meet the requirements discussed previously to trigger a mandatory
takedown. Of course, the good faith belief that the materials are the
copyrighted works of the complainant must be met,' 14 but in many such
disputes, the defaming poster has employed copyrighted material subject to
a takedown notice. This protection, however, can be abused. The firm
Medical Justice Inc. had created a 'vaccine against libel,' a set of
contracts providing authority to doctors over online comments posted by
patients.""' The control was a provision granting the doctors exclusive
copyright in any comments or posts about the health care provider.116 The
all-too-clever contract sparked a class action lawsuit, and shortly
thereafter, was retired." 7
According to a report of the class action lawsuit, a New York Dentist
issued the following promise:
[She] promise[d] not to evade HIPAA's patient privacy
protection in return for patients' commitment not to
disparage her, not to post any comments about her
publicly; if the patient writes anything about the dentist,
the patient assigns the copyright in those comments to
[Dentist Stacy Makhnevich].
Relying on the form,
Makhnevich sent one of her patients invoices purporting to
bill him a daily hundred-dollar fine for having posted
comments about her on Internet review web sites."

17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) (2006).
1s Alicia Gallegos, Company Withdraws Contracts Controlling Online Comments by
Patients, AM. MED. NEWS (Jan. 2, 2012), http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2012/01/02/
prsa002.htm.
114

116 Id.
117 Id. See also Paul Alan Levy, Medical Injustice - Contracts that Suppress Patient
Comments About Their Doctors or Dentists, PUBLIC CITIZEN (Nov. 30, 2011),
http://pubcit.typepad.com/clpblog/201 1/1 1/medical-injustice-contracts-that-suppresspatient-comments-about-their-doctors-or-dentists.html.
118 Levy, supra note 117.
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The class action lawsuit will undoubtedly highlight the various ethical
and professional lapses of the vaccinating agreement. At the outset, if the
report is accurate, then the exchange of the legal HIPAA duty cannot even
serve as consideration for the transfer of copyright, so the agreement fails
to be a valid contract for lack of consideration."1 9 While transfer of
copyright has been upheld in videogame end user license agreements, this
has been in the context of the consumer receiving a license to use the game
to generate copyrightable content within the game as part of the
gameplay.120 In the absence of any consumer or public health benefit, the
transfer of exclusive rights as a condition of medical services could, and
should, be deemed unconscionable. 12 1 Moreover, because this is a
copyright case, the prevailing party may be entitled to attorneys' fees.12 2
This embarrassing and improvident use of an overly aggressive policing
technique should provide a solid reminder of the importance for restraint in
policing harmful speech.
Instead, once content that is "bad" but not infringing, defamatory, or
invasive of privacy appears online, the better strategy is to mitigate the
damage by relying on the rapid staleness of Internet content. Most readers
will find such unwanted content through searching. The unwanted content
cannot be removed, but it can be pushed down to the latter pages of a
search by publishing relevant, positive content that is trafficked and crosslinked.12 3 Many services promise such resources.124 This Article cannot
address the effectiveness of such techniques, but they are far better than the
secondary damage one can do to a reputation by unwarranted overSee White v. Vill. of Homewood, 628 N.E.2d 616, 619 (Ill. Ct. App. 1993)
("Consideration cannot flow from an act performed pursuant to a pre-existing legal duty.");
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73 (1981) ("Performance of a legal duty owed to
a promisor which is neither doubtful nor the subject of honest dispute is not consideration;
but a similar performance is consideration if it differs from what was required by the duty in
a way which reflects more than a pretense of bargain.").
120 See, e.g., Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 639 (8th Cir. 2005); ProCD,
Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1448-49 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Mark A. Lemley,
Intellectual Propertyand ShrinkwrapLicenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1239, 1241 (1995).
121See, e.g., Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d
593 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
122 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2006).
123
Online
Reputation
Management
Services,
RANDOM
BYTE,
"9

http://www.randombyte.com/online-reputation-management-services/ (last visited Feb. 22,
2013).
124E.g., id.
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aggressive policing. As with any countermeasure, a moderated and
proportionate response remains the key.
IV. TRADEMARK
Unlike the copyright system, which provides for a notice-andtakedown mechanism, trademark owners are left with a much more
ambiguous and ill-defined set of steps to take. The only statutory
protection for trademarks tailored to the online environment has come in
the form of domain name protection.125
In the absence of any specifically tailored statutory response, the
Lanham Actl26 is interpreted to address the role of trademarks in the online
environment. In most instances, this is done by assessing whether the
trademark in question was a registered mark1 27 or was protected from
unfair competition, 128 the strength of mark,129 and the various factors that
suggest a likelihood of confusion between the plaintiff's mark and
defendant's mark. 3 0
As applied online, many of the same issues regarding likelihood of
confusion take on new meaning. Counterfeiting is a serious problem for
15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2006).
Id. §§ 1051-1141n.
1 7 Id. § 1114(1)(a).
28
' Id. § 1125.
125

26
1
2

129

Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 772-73 (1992) (explaining to

be treated as a trademark, the symbol in question must be distinctive either because it is
inherently distinctive or because it has acquired secondary meaning as a source identifier).
See also Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9-11 (2d Cir. 1976).
130 AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979). To determine
the likelihood of confusion, a number of factors are weighed. For example, the following
are the Sleekcraft factors:
1. strength of the mark; 2. proximity of the goods; 3. similarity of
the marks; 4. evidence of actual confusion; 5. marketing channels used;
6. type of goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised by the
purchaser; 7. Defendant's intent in selecting the mark; and 8. likelihood
of expansion of the product lines.
Id. Each Circuit has its own set of similar factors, described slightly differently. See, e.g.,
Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 224 (3d Cir. 2005);
Henri's Food Prod. Co. v. Kraft Inc., 717 F.2d 352, 354 (7th Cir. 1983); Beer Nuts. Inc. v.
Clover Club Foods Co., 711 F.2d 934, 940 (10th Cir. 1983).
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owners of popular products, and using the Internet to sell counterfeit goods
does not significantly change the law or its application.131 For trademarks
that are not federally registered, protection only applies to the geographic
area in which the mark is exploited. 132 Nonetheless, because the Internet
has no geographic limitations, this can give rise to additional conflicts
between remote users and create consumer confusion where none had

previously existed. 13 3
A. Trademarks and Internet Speech
There remains a great deal of confusion among the public and even the
courts regarding the use of trademarks by bloggers, Twitter users, social
media enthusiasts, and others. 13 4 The Citizen Media Law Project sums up
the situation quite elegantly:
The good news is that courts have consistently protected
the public's right to use the trademarks of others in order
to engage in criticism, commentary, news reporting and
other forms of noncommercial expression. As long as
what you're doing is really commentary, criticism, or
reporting (etc.), and not a surreptitious attempt to sell
goods or services, or to deceptively attract customers or
readers you otherwise would not have had, you should be
able to defeat a trademark claim brought against you. The
bad news is that the law relating to this intersection of
trademark law and free expression is complex and
confusing.
Neither Congress nor the courts have
developed a simple and clear rule that protects your rights
to use the trademarks of others for free speech purposes;
instead they've developed a complex array of defenses to

'. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 ("A 'counterfeit' is a spurious mark which is identical with, or
substantially indistinguishable from, a registered mark.").
132 See David S. Barrett, The Future of the Concurrent Use of Trademarks Doctrine
in

the Information Age, 23 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 687, 692-93 (2001).
3 Id. at 689, 703.
134 See generally William McGeveran, FourFree Speech Goalsfor Trademark Law, 18
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1205 (2008).
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trademark claims that even lawyers find difficult to
untangle.135
What should be the threshold issue is often left until far too late in the
analysis, namely whether the unauthorized user of the trademark is making
a commercial use of the mark.' 36 This approach has had limited judicial
support. 1 Unfortunately, courts seem to treat any links to advertising or
income as a commercial use-an approach that would render newspapers
subject to commercial speech standards because of the advertisements they
run.' 38 Over time, this Internet exceptionalism will erode, but for now,
other approaches are necessary to explain what a speaker can do with the
trademark of another.
As presently interpreted, the notion of commercial use typically
involves using trademarks in parodies.13 9
The courts have adopted different ways of
incorporating such First Amendment interests into the
analysis. For example, some courts have applied the
general "likelihood of confusion" analysis, using the First
Amendment as a factor in the analysis. Other courts have
expressly balanced First Amendment considerations
against the degree of likely confusion. Still other courts
have held that the First Amendment effectively trumps
135 Using

the

Trademarks

of

Others,

CITIZENS

MEDIA

LAW

PROJECT,

http://www.citmedialaw.org/legal-guide/using-trademarks-others (last visited Feb. 22,
2013).
136See, e.g., FieldTurf, Inc. v. Triexe Mgmt. Grp., Inc., No. 03 C 5704, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22280, at *3-4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 11, 2003) ("The trademark infringement statute, 15
U.S.C. § 11 14(1)(a), the unfair competition statute, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), and the trademark
dilution statute, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c), all require the trademark owner to demonstrate that
the defendant used the mark in commerce.").
"n Compare Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 678 (9th Cir. 2005)
(finding no commercial use on gripe site that had no advertising or links to commercial
sites), with Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770, 775 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding
commercial use was supported by a link on one of the defendant's site to the defendant
girlfriend's shirt business).
1' See Using the Trademarks of Others, supra note 135.
139 Overview of Trademark Law, HARVARD LAW, http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/
metaschool/fisher/domain/tm.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2013) ("[C]ertain parodies of
trademarks may be permissible if they are not too directly tied to commercial use.").
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trademark law, under certain circumstances. In general,
however, the courts appear to be more sympathetic to the
extent that parodies are less commercial, and less
sympathetic to the extent that parodies involve commercial

use of the mark.140
A more practical analysis would recognize that the Muppet character,
Spa'am, was not a commercial use of the Hormel trademark; 14 1 the "Enjoy
Cocaine" poster featuring the trademark and trade dress of the Enjoy Coke
trademark was not a competitive product;14 2 and a titillating parody of an
L.L. Bean advertisement was not an actual advertisement.143
Beyond noncommercial use and its parody counterpart, there are two
types of fair use. The first type is nominative fair use, under which the
trademark can be used when it is used correctly, without creating consumer
confusion as to the actual source of the mark.'" Nominative use includes
the right to identify the trademarks of goods and services in reviews,
critiques, and even competitive advertisements.145 The owner of a
trademark cannot thwart bad press merely by claiming ownership of the

product's name.14 6
The second type of fair use involves traditional fair use in which a
word, though it may be a trademark in some contexts, is used for its
ordinary meaning.14 7 No one, for example, would expect the maker of
iPads to stop a grocery store from advertising Apples-even if the word
were capitalized. The word used in its ordinary context has no trademark
value. Similarly, the use of the phrase "fish fry" cannot infringe the
trademark "Fish-Fri" when used to describe the purpose of the product. 148
140 id
141Hormel

Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 500 (2d Cir. 1996).
Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1186 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
143 L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 27-28 (1st Cir. 1987).
1" Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1175-76 (9th Cir. 2010);
New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992).
145 See New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 306.
146 Brother Records, Inc. v. Jardine, 318 F.3d 900, 908 (9th Cir. 2003); Downing v.
Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1009 (9th Cir. 2001); Volkswagenwerk
Aktiengesellschaft v. Church, 411 F.2d 350, 352 (9th Cir. 1969).
147 Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 791 (5th Cir. 1983).
148 Id. at 792. See also KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543
U.S. 111, 122 (2004) (holding that some possibility of consumer confusion about the origin
of goods or services affected was compatible with fair use).
142Coca-Cola
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Using a trademark with a link to its competitor's website,
misrepresenting endorsements, or otherwise misleading the public (other
than self-evident parody) raises issues of actionable consumer confusion or
unfair competition. 149 As a result, everyone who posts or tweets must ask
themselves both whether they are using a trademark and whether the use is
misleading. A misleading use is not protected as a fair use.150 If the
trademark claim is more accurately a claim for product disparagement,
then the earlier discussion of defamation is the more applicable standard. '5
B. Early Commercial Battles-Links, Frames,Domains, and Metatags
1. Linking
Among business competitors, the issues of trademark infringement are
of far more significant concern. Linking has never been considered a
copyright violation because the link merely provides access to the
copyright owner's own material.152 The URL in the link is a fact, an
address that cannot be protected by copyright.153
There has been some concern that deep linking-creating the hypertext
149 See Soilworks, LLC v. Midwest Indus. Supply, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1129-30
(D. Ariz. 2008).
150 Id. at 1130. Use in a fictional work or parody is likely not to be treated by the reader
or viewer as factual, so it is far less likely to be misleading. Nonetheless, even fictional
works are sometimes the subject of litigation for misrepresenting a product as dangerous.
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 583 (1994).
151 See discussionsupra Part
III.
152 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 937-38
(2005). Links to infringing content can result in contributory liability if the standards for
culpability are met. Id. at 937.
153 Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.Com, Inc., No. CV 99-7654 HLH(BQRX), 2000 WL
525390, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2000). The court explained:

Further, hyperlinking does not itself involve a violation of the
Copyright Act (whatever it may do for other claims) since no copying is
involved, the customer is automatically transferred to the particular
genuine web page of the original author. There is no deception in what
is happening. This is analogous to using a library's card index to get
reference to particular items, albeit faster and more efficiently.
Id. See also Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1356 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Narell v.
Freeman 872 F.2d 907, 910 (9th Cir. 1989)) ("Copyright law protects an author's
expression; facts and ideas within a work are not protected.").
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links to pages other than the homepage of a site-could create additional
legal liability.15 4 However, this practice has become ubiquitous, largely
causing this concern to disappear. Internet sites have responded by moving
their ads to the pages with the popular content.' 55 Citizen Media Law
Project notes, "No court has ever found that deep linking to another
website constitutes copyright or trademark infringement.. . . Therefore,
you can link to other websites without serious concerns about legal liability
for the link itself, with the exception of activities that might be
contributory copyright infringement .... 156
Breach of contract may be the one remaining basis for liability.
Particularly if the site is protected by software that requires a clickwrap
agreement so that anyone who uses the site must begin by reviewing and
agreeing to those terms, then deep linking past the clickwrap might be a
breach of the agreement.15 7 Moreover, depending on the technology
designed to assure compliance with the clickwrap, the strategy to deep link
could reveal a breach of the anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA.I58
From a trademark perspective, the other linking concern is the extent
to which the design of the first page and the use of the links can create a
false impression as to the source of the content, advertisements, and goods
on the linked pages.'5 9 The test remains one of consumer confusion, but a
clever design might suggest that the defendant's site is actually a
component of the plaintiffs site and use this confusion to redirect
consumers and business.16 0 Such confusion and redirection through the use
of website design and deep links would undoubtedly be actionable.161
154

Linking

to

Copyrighted

Materials,

CITIZEN

MEDIA

http://www.citmedialaw.org/legal-guide/linking-copyrighted-materials
2013).

LAW

PROJECT,

(last visited Feb. 22,

155 id.
156

id

5

1 1Id

See also 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006).

' Linking to CopyrightedMaterials,supra note 154.

See generally id.
Consider a counterfeiting website that copied the links to its target's privacy
policy, contact pages and other footer pages. Such activities would violate the anticounterfeiting provisions of the Lanham Act, particularly if the counterfeiting site mirrored
or linked to products of the target site and then directed customers to its own shopping cart.
See Frank C. Gomez, Note, Copyright: Preemption: Misappropriation:Washington Post v.
Total News, Inc., 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 21, 22 (1998).
160

161 Id.
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2. Framing
A variation of this technique is known as framing. "Framing enables a
Web page designer to split a page into independent scrollable
regions, . . . . [T]he framing feature allows a user to 'display' a portion of a
separate Web site on the one originally accessed."l 62 Because framing
intentionally blurs the source of the content between the various sites, the
unauthorized use of a third party's framed content is potentially more
likely to lead to consumer confusion and therefore trademark liability. As
Citizens Media Law Project notes, "Depending on how you design your
page, a user might be confused into believing that all of the source material
is yours. Some plaintiffs have sued websites for framing under trademark
and related areas of law, but most cases have settled and the law remains

unclear."1 63
Despite the lack of reported decisions, the leading controversy
involved Total News, which created frames but then displayed the content
of other publishers including the Washington Post.164 To the extent such
frames hide the actual trademarks of the content providers or associate
Total News trademarks with content that it did not create, the frames
created a likelihood of confusion as to the source of the content, which it
exploited by selling advertising on its site.' 65 The case was ultimately
settled.'66
3. Domains
To the dismay of trademark holders, even the domain name of a
company may not automatically create consumer confusion.167
Cybersquatting requires "bad faith intent to profit from that mark." 68

162 Gomez, supra note 161, at 22.
163 Linking to CopyrightedMaterials,supra note 154.
' See Complaint, Washington Post Co. v. Total News, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 1190
(S.D.N.Y. 1997), 1997 WL 33633041.
165
Id. 52.
166 Nicole M. Bond, Linking and Framing on the Internet: Liability Under Trademark
and Copyright Law, 11 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 185, 196 (1998). Under the terms of the
settlement agreement, Total News agreed to remove its frames, but retained the right to link
to the plaintiffs news content. Id.
161 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2006).
168 The Lanham Act provides the following on cyberpiracy
prevention:
(continued)
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Some words-such as apple, diamond, or Hyatt-represent different
trademark owners in non-overlapping industries. There simply is no right
for one of those owners to have rights over the dot-com version of the
domain. No user will be able to demonstrate a bad faith use by the other
parties with a reasonable purpose for using the domain.
In other situations, using a trademark as part of a longer domain may
also.represent nominative fair use. The "sucks" sites that integrate the
corporate trade name and the sucks appellation are unlikely to confuse the
public regarding the source of the site critical to ownership.
Similarly, sites that do not confuse the public can use the trademark in
a nominative fashion. As one court explained:
You can preen
about your Mercedes
at
mercedesforum.com and mercedestalk.net, read the latest
about
your
double-skim-no-whip
latte
at
starbucksgossip.com and find out what goodies the
world's greatest electronics store has on sale this week at
fryselectronics-ads.com. Consumers who use the internet
for shopping are generally quite sophisticated about such
matters and won't be fooled into thinking that the
prestigious German car manufacturer sells boots at
mercedesboots.com, or homes at mercedeshomes.com, or
that comcastsucks.org is sponsored or endorsed by the TV

A person shall be liable in a civil action by the owner of a mark,
including a personal name which is protected as a mark under this
section, if, without regard to the goods or services of the parties, that
person(i) has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark, including a
personal name which is protected as a mark under this section; and
(ii) registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that(I) in the case of a mark that is distinctive at the time of
registration of the domain name, is identical or confusingly similar to
that mark; (II) in the case of a famous mark that is famous at the time of
registration of the domain name, is identical or confusingly similar to or
dilutive of that mark; or (III) is a trademark, word, or name protected by
reason of section 706 of title 18 or section 220506 of title 36.
Id. § 1I25(d)(1)(A).
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cable company just because the string of letters making up
its trademark appears in the domain. 16 9
4. Metatags
Prior to the ascendance of the Google algorithm that ranks pages based
on relevance,17 0 a primary ranking tool was the text on a site and the
metatags encoded into a site. 171 "A metatag is a part of a Web site that is
not seen by the public, but is read by search engine web browsers and later
used by the browsers to classify the Web site." 7 2 Although hidden text
and metatags may play lesser roles in page rankings, they still affect the
ability of a search engine to find a particular page in response to a query.7
"Metatags are used to increase the probability that a Web site will be seen
by a customer who has typed a particular search query into his or her
search engine." 74
Metatags are essential for the public to find content on the Internet.175
When these cases were first litigated, there was a tendency to assume any
use of another's domain name or metatag was likely to cause confusion:
When a firm uses a competitor's trademark in the
domain name of its web site, users are likely to be
confused as to its source or sponsorship. Similarly, using
a competitor's trademark in the metatags of such web site
is likely to cause what we have described as initial interest

169 Toyota
1o

Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1178 (9th Cir. 2010).
See Jon M. Garon, SearchingInside Google: Cases, Controversiesand the Future of

the World's Most Provocative Company, 30 LOYOLA L.A. ENT. L. REv. 429, 431 (2010).
1' See generally id. at 430-31 (explaining how Google continues to use text-matching
techniques in addition to its PageRank software).
172Australian Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228, 1233 n.3 (10th Cir. 2006).
173See Garon, supra note 170, at 430-31.
74
1 Hagfeld, 436 F.3d at 1233 n.3.
75
s See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION

§ 25:69 (4th ed. 2012) ("Search engines in the early days of the Internet relied heavily on
metatags to find Web sites. However, modem search engines no longer use Metatags.");
HTML Metatags, ECHOECHO.COM, http://www.echoecho.com/htmlmetatags01.htm (last
visited Feb. 22, 2013) (explaining the differences between keyword and description
metatags and their prospective usefulness).
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confusion. These forms of confusion are exactly what the
trademark laws are designed to prevent.7 6
In the ensuing years, however, the public's reliance on domain names
and metatags has diminished and the courts' expectations of the reasonable
consumer have increased.177 Today, when used accurately, metatags can
represent nominative fair use, accurately listing products or services of a
company.1 78 From the broader context of the website, the consumers
understand when a third party is selling a product lawfully, but without
authorization. Retailers can list the names of the products on their
websites and in the metatags enabling search engines without the
permission of the manufacturers. When instead the metatags are used as
part of a larger effort to create consumer confusion, however, the invisible
nature of the metatag will not shield its user from creating consumer
confusion and trademark infringement.179
In sum, the old battles of linking, framing, domain names, and
metatags have comfortably resolved back into the traditional notions of
likelihood of consumer confusion. Courts distinguish nominative and
descriptive use of terms from the misuse of terms and marks likely to
create consumer confusion, just as they have outside the Internet for many
decades.
C New Battles-Keyword Advertising
Just as the trademark disputes over frames and metatags reflected the
tension between business owners to define fair competition, the current
controversy focuses on the importance of "search" as the primary method
176

Brookfield Commc'ns v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1066 (9th Cir.

1999).
1' Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 115354 (9th Cir. 2011) (reversing the lower court because they used too low a standard for the
expectations of the modern reasonable consumer, and applying as another relevant factor
the difference between domain name and keyword search confusion).
171See Hatfield, 436 F.3d at 1239 (stating defendant's listing of plaintiff s trademarks in
defendant's metatags constituted initial confusion); Faegre & Benson, LLP v. Purdy, 367 F.
Supp. 2d 1238, 1247 (D. Minn. 2005) ("Based on the fair use defense. . . Purdy can legally
use Faegre's marks in his metatags in the descriptive sense ... however, he is not permitted
to use Faegre's marks in his metatags in order to divert internet users from Faegre's web
site.").
"' Hatfield, 436 F.3d at 1239-40. See also Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1063 (analogizing
non-internet interest confusion with internet-based interest confusion).
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of finding online content. Consumers typically use the search function in
their browser, tablet, or smartphone to find online content rather than
relying on hundreds or thousands of bookmarks and hot links.s 0 Google's
AdWords is the largest such program.' 8 ' Advertising revenue-much of it
from AdWords-accounts for 97% of Google's revenue;182
AdWords is Google's program through which
advertisers purchase terms (or keywords). When entered
as a search term, the keyword triggers the appearance of
the advertiser's ad and link. An advertiser's purchase of a
particular term causes the advertiser's ad and link to be
displayed on the user's screen whenever a searcher
launches a Google search based on the purchased search
term. Advertisers pay Google based on the number of
times Internet users "click" on the advertisement, so as to
link to the advertiser's website.'13
Microsoft's Bing provides a similar service.184
As the debate over keyword advertising moved through the courts, the
initial question was whether the purchase of a keyword-absent the word's

See Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 125 (discussing Google's search
function and its utility to users); Vitality Friedman, Google PageRank: What Do We Know
About It?, SMASHING MAG. (June 5, 2007), http://www.smashingmagazine.com/2007/06/05/
google-pagerank-what-do-we-really-know-about-it/ (stating that Google's search function
"helps keep our search clean and efficient"); Eric Siu, 24 Eye-Popping SEQ Statistics,
SEARCH ENGINE J. (Apr. 19, 2012), http://www.searchenginejoumal.com/24-eye-poppingseo-statistics/42665/ ("93% of online experiences begin with a search engine . .. 82.6% of
internet users use search.").
181 Regina Nelson Eng, A Likelihood of Infringement: The Purchase and Sale of
Trademarks As Adwords, 18 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 493, 495 (2008) ("With access to over
eighty-six percent of internet users, Google's flagship advertising program, AdWords, is
one of the most powerful resources for internet advertisers, as well as Google's highest
revenue source.").
182 Garon, supra note 170,
at 432.
18 Rescuecom, 562 F.3d at 125.
184 Bing Ads, MICROSOFT, http://advertise.bingads.microsoft.com/en-us/bing-ads-how180

it-works?s cid=ussmb_a web bingfooter (last visited Feb. 22, 2013).
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appearance on the search engine-constituted a use in commerce."ss This
debate was reminiscent of the early discussion of metatags because the
words themselves were not read by the consumer but instead led the
software to present different content.
Originally, the Ninth Circuit
"assumed, without expressly deciding, that the use of a trademark as a
search engine keyword that triggers the display of a competitor's
advertisement is a 'use in commerce' under the Lanham Act." 86 The
Second Circuit struggled more with the concept, but in a very thoughtful
opinion, answered the question in the affirmative 87 and seemed to lay the
question to rest. 8 8
Determining that the keyword is a use in commerce constitutes only
the threshold question regarding the likelihood of consumer confusion.
For the search engine companies and intermediaries, the probable result is
that they cannot be found to be creating consumer confusion with their
customers advertising so long as they continue to clearly distinguish
between advertisements based upon the keyword entries and the actual
results of their algorithms. The separation between ads and indexed
searches is a business choice that is presently being made by Google,
Microsoft (owner of Bing), and the companies that license their search
services. 18 Nothing in the architecture of the search algorithm requires
this separation.' 90 On the other hand, the concern over trademark liability
and consumer backlash at the potential confusion is likely to keep the
practice stable-at least for now.
Between competitors, the situation is less clear. A recent example of
this dispute arose when a competitor of the national law firm of Binder and

1851-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 755 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1169-70 (D. Utah
2010) (quoting J.G. Wentworth, S.S.C. LP v. Settlement Funding LLC, No. 06-0597, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 288, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2007)).
186Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, 638 F.3d 1137, 1144 (9th

Cir. 2011).
18 Rescuecom, 562 F.3d at 130. See also MCCARTHY, supra note 175, at §§ 23:11.50,
25:70.15.
'88 See, e.g., Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1145.
'89 Rescuecom, 562 F.3d at 130 n.4.
iso Binder v. Disability Grp., Inc., 772 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1174 (C.D. Cal. 2011). See
also Steven Levy, How Google's Algorithm Rules the Web, WIRED (Feb. 22, 2010, 12:00
PM), http://www.wired.com/magazine/2010/02/ff google algorithm.
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Binder purchased the firm's trademark for advertising.1 91 The district court
analyzed the dispute as follows:
The Defendants do not dispute that they used Plaintiffs'
mark in their Google AdWord [sic] campaign. Moreover,
we find as a matter of fact that Defendants used the
"Binder and Binder" mark in a Google AdWord [sic]
campaign. We find that Defendants bid successfully on
the name with the result that Defendants' website appeared
as a sponsored link on Google when potential customers
searched for Plaintiffs' trademarked name. Thus, the only
two elements in dispute are Plaintiffs' ownership of the
marks and the likelihood of confusion. 192
The district court addressed all the likelihood-of-confusion factors and
determined that the use of an identical mark in keyword advertising, along
with evidence of actual confusion, constituted sufficient evidence to
support a finding of likelihood of confusion.' 93 The court also found false
advertising and state law liability.194
As a jurisprudential matter, the Ninth Circuit has reasserted that the
entire likelihood-of-confusion test-not merely a subset-should be used
to address likelihood of confusion.' 95 The Ninth Circuit had previously
narrowed the test for Internet-based initial interest confusion: "In the
context of the Web in particular, the three most important Sleekcraft
factors are (1) the similarity of the marks, (2) the relatedness of the goods
or services, and (3) the simultaneous use of the Web as a marketing
channel."' 96 The court has since retreated from this subset of factors. 97
As demonstrated by the facts of Binder v. Disability Group, Inc., actual
confusion may prove a compelling reason to find that the particular use of
another's keyword advertising is actionable.' 9 8
As with Binder, other lawsuits suggest substantial confusion can result
from using a competitor's trademark in keyword advertising and the paid
'91Binder, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 1175.
192

d
'93 Id. at 1176-77.
194 Id. at 1178.

Rearden LLC v. Rearden Commerce, Inc., 683 F.3d 1190, 1209-10 (9th Cir. 2012).
Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1205 (9th Cir. 2000).

'

196 GOTO.com,

'
98

1

Binder, 772 F.2d at 1176.

Id. at 1176-77.
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link ads they generate ("Sponsored Links").199 "According to the survey
results, 67.6% of test group respondents expected that they would reach
GEICO's Web site if they clicked on the Sponsored Links, and 69.5%
thought that the Sponsored Links were either links to GEICO's site or
The numbers speak for
affiliated with GEICO in some way., 200
themselves, supporting a finding of likelihood of confusion for Sponsored
Links.20 1
As a practical matter, Congress may wish to step into this arena.
While using another's trademark for nominative or descriptive fair use
remains applicable to keyword advertising in the same fashion as it applies
to domain names, metatags, and traditional media, the use causes a serious
economic harm because of too little trademark protection. Were all
keyword advertising permitted, then the effect is not to improve consumer
access to competitive products so much as it is to allow the search engines
companies to drive up the cost of keyword advertising through the bidding
process used to purchase the keywords.
Put another way, Google and Bing increase their profitability when
multiple bidders want the top listing for the same term. If a company's
direct competitor can bid to rank higher in the sponsored listing, the
company must either pay more to use its own name or give ground to its
rival. Google and Bing make ever-increasing profits. 20 2

9

Gov't Emps. Ins. Co. v. Google Inc., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1841, 1846 (E.D. Va.

2005).
200 id
201 Id.
202

at 1847.

The companies do provide some relief to trademark holders, with some jurisdictions

demanding far greater trademark scrutiny than the United States. As a result, the Google
trademark policy is illustrative:
Google recognizes the importance of trademarks. Our AdWords
Terms and Conditions prohibit intellectual property infringement by
advertisers. Advertisers are responsible for the keywords they choose
to trigger their ads and the text they choose to use in those ads.
Google takes allegations of trademark infringement very seriously
and, as a courtesy, we investigate matters raised by trademark owners.
Advertising Policy: Help for Trademark Owners, GOOGLE, http://support.google.com/
adwordspolicy/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer--2562124 (last visited Feb. 22, 2013).
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The consumers pay for the cost of advertising in the continuously
increasing price of their goods.20 3 Moreover, to the extent that the search
engines actively suggest the use of the trademarks as keywords, they
induce competitors to use each other's marks to maximize rankings.
Careful study must be undertaken to determine whether the effect is to
increase competition and access of products for consumers or merely to
enrich the search engine companies at the expense of the public and the
less-well financed corporate competitors. Any solution must maintain
expansive fair use rights and uses that serve a competitive commercial
purpose-such as parody, comment or criticisms.
Nonetheless, the
public's interest must be assessed.
D. Final Words-EternalDiligence
Trademark management invariably starts with an ongoing policing of
the mark. This can be accomplished with the tools made available by
search engines,20 the ongoing monitoring of the use of a trademark online,
and the regular assessment of the trademarks used by others. Nonetheless,
diligence and engagement remains the most critical step.
Many of the battles over trademark rights stem from parties having
spent a good deal of time, effort, and money on establishing the use of the
trademark. 2 05 The earlier a trademark owner can alert a third party to the
problems associated with the use, the more likely that party will
accommodate the request.2 06
At the same time, eternal diligence should not equate to zero tolerance.
Trademark owners make constant use of fair use, and as such, companies
should be mindful of the key functions their trademarks serve for others.
V. CONCLUSION
In the relatively short time since laws were enacted to protect service
providers from defamation lawsuits and Internet companies from
secondary liability for copyright infringement, the role of the Internet has

203

Thomas L. Eovaldi, The Market for Consumer Product Evaluations: An Analysis

and a Proposal,79 Nw. U. L. REv. 1235, 1240 n.24 (1985).
204 Advertising Policy: Help for TrademarkOwners,
supra note 202.
205 Melissa Ung, Trademark Law and the Repercussions of Virtual
Property (IRL), 17
COMMLAW CONSPECTUs 679,696 (2008).
206 See Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming TrademarkBullies, 2011 Wis.
L. REv. 625, 63839.
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transformed into a central part of all communications strategies and has
integrated into the global village's daily life.
In less than two decades, the mores of the Internet have transformed
from the Wild West to the Town Square, and the interpretation of the
intellectual property and media laws that shape the Internet have kept pace.
As this Article suggests, inconceivable problems of domain names and
illegal cyber posts are now handled routinely. There remain instances of
both overprotection and underprotection, content owners that thump chests
and threaten all, as well as self-anointed activists who respect no
ownership, but the extremism at the margin does not define Facebook's
845 million monthly users or affect more than a mere fraction of the 250
million photographs uploaded daily. 20 7 If the numbers say anything, they
suggest the system largely works.
Still, for each innovation, there is new wine to be served-sometimes
in new bottles, sometimes in old. Innovation continues at a breathtaking
pace, so the only thing certain is that today's solutions will soon transform
into tomorrow's challenges. For content owners, this suggests three
essential steps for success: (i) diligence in all policing efforts; (ii)
moderation and measured responses in terms of time, effort, and expense
to each unauthorized use; and (iii) a sense of humor-because this too shall
pass.
The Internet will never be pristine, but perhaps this will help tidy it up
a bit.

Facebook, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Feb. 1, 2012), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/datal1326801/000119312512034517/d287954dsl.htm#
toc287954_2.
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